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Abstract
State of the art deep generative networks are capable of
producing images with such incredible realism that they can
be suspected of memorizing training images. It is why it is
not uncommon to include visualizations of training set near-
est neighbors, to suggest generated images are not simply
memorized. We demonstrate this is not sufficient and mo-
tivates the need to study memorization/overfitting of deep
generators with more scrutiny. This paper addresses this
question by i) showing how simple losses are highly effec-
tive at reconstructing images for deep generators ii) an-
alyzing the statistics of reconstruction errors when recon-
structing training and validation images, which is the stan-
dard way to analyze overfitting in machine learning. Us-
ing this methodology, this paper shows that overfitting is
not detectable in the pure GAN models proposed in the
literature, in contrast with those using hybrid adversarial
losses, which are amongst the most widely applied gener-
ative methods. The paper also shows that standard GAN
evaluation metrics fail to capture memorization for some
deep generators. Finally, the paper also shows how off-the-
shelf GAN generators can be successfully applied to face
inpainting and face super-resolution using the proposed re-
construction method, without hybrid adversarial losses.
1. Introduction and related work
In just a few short years, image generation with deep net-
works has gone from niche to the center piece of machine
learning. This was largely initiated by Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs) [12]. Incredible progress has been
made, from deep convolutional GAN (DCGAN) [25] pro-
ducing clearly computer generated faces, to PGGANs [16]
producing faces which are virtually indistinguishable from
real ones even to human observers and at high resolution
(see Fig. 1). Images have such realism in fact that it is
somewhat standard to include nearest neighbors for gener-
ated images to suggest that training examples weren’t mem-
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Figure 1: Rather than inspecting the nearest neighbor (col-
umn NND(y)) in the training dataset D (here CelebA-HQ)
for a few sampled generated images y = G(z), as usu-
ally done for evaluating GANs, we consider in this work the
opposite: finding the most similar image (NNG(y)) in the
manifold G of generated images and measure its discrep-
ancy with the reference image y ∈ D. We demonstrate that
analyzing the discrepancy for NNG with image y ∈ D ver-
sus y 6∈ D makes it possible to detect training images that
are memorized by the generator G.
orized [7, 16]. Memorization1 is not simply a curiosity for
1As in [25], the terms ’memorization’ and ’overfitting’ are used inter-
changeably.
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generative models; in fact, it is easy to envision a setting
where training data is private or copyrighted and should not
appear in generated images.
Fig. 1 (last column) illustrates the nearest neighbor (NN)
test, where NND(y) is the training dataset NN of a few im-
ages y. While NN with the Euclidean distance is surpris-
ingly good at recovering pose with registered face images
(last column in Fig. 1), it is very sensitive to simple pertur-
bations, such as flipping (see the last two rows of Fig. 1).
Consequently, giving the NN in the train set in not enough
to guaranty that the GAN is not generating memorized im-
ages.
In contrast, we suggest to rely on the opposite method-
ology by optimizing the latent code z ∼ Z to find the near-
est neighbors NNG(y) in the manifold of generated faces
G = {G(z)}z∼Z of images from the training (y ∈ D) and
a validation set (y 6∈ D). As shown in the second column
of Fig. 1, exploring the latent space makes NN search much
more robust to such perturbation. Using this framework that
we refer to as latent recovery, two main contributions are
proposed:
• A comprehensive study of Latent Recovery for gen-
erative networks. In Section 2, recovery errors reveal
insight into the specificity of generators. We then suc-
cessfully apply latent recovery to perform inpainting
and face super-resolution in Section 4.
• Section 3 introduces a simple yet novel way to de-
tect memorization/overfitting in any deep generator via
statistics of latent recovery errors on test and train sets.
Overfitting is undetectable for GANs, which is corrob-
orated visually in Fig. 3 and statistically in Table 1.
Overfitting is however detectable in hybrid adversarial
losses such as CycleGAN [35], and easily detectable
in non-adversarial generators such as GLO [4]. Addi-
tionally, we show that standard evaluation metrics do
not detect overfitting in some models.
1.1. Related Work
Adversarial like losses have seen successful applications
in a myriad of settings: unpaired image to image transla-
tion in the hybrid adversarial loss in CycleGAN [35], face
attribute modification in StarGAN [8] and various image in-
painting techniques [14, 32] to name a few. This progress
has created a huge need to evaluate generated image quality,
which to some degree has not been fully answered [6].
GAN Evaluation Metrics The Fre´chet Inception Dis-
tance (FID) [13] has been adopted as a popular and effective
way to evaluate generative models which can be sampled.
In the wide scale study [19], FID was used to compare a
huge variety of GANs, wherein it was shown auxiliary fac-
tors such as hyperparameter tuning can obfuscate true dif-
ferences between GANs. In [26], notions of precision and
recall are introduced for generated images, to help charac-
terize model failure rather than providing a scalar in image
quality.
Overfitting For image classification, overfitting is defined
as the discrepancy between the performance of a classifier
on the training set and a hold out set of images. As a testa-
ment to the memorization ability of deep networks, Zhang
et al.[33], demonstrated arbitrary labels can be perfectly
memorized for enormous sets of training images.
Notions of generalization for generative models are less
standardized. In DCGAN [25], questions about overfit-
ting/memorization are already raised. In [1], the authors
defined generalization for GANs in a largely theoretical set-
ting. The formulation, however, was used to suggest a new
GAN training protocol rather than provide an evaluation
technique. In [2], the support of a GAN generator, in terms
of the number of face identities it could produce, was es-
timated using the birthday paradox heuristic. While crude,
it suggested the support of faces could be quite large with
respect to the size of the training set.
Memorization and Privacy Beyond these aspects of
memorization and practical evaluation of generators lies the
important and debated issue of privacy: How to ensure that
the data used for training cannot leak by some reverse engi-
neering, such as CNN inversion [20] or reconstruction from
feature [31] ? Because GANs have seen such widespread
real world application for image editing, it is imperative
that we have better evaluations tools to assess how much
these networks have overfit the training data. For example,
if a user is using a neural net to inpaint faces as in [17] or
to perform super-resolution enhancing [9], it seems neces-
sary to ensure verbatim copies of training images do not
appear, due to privacy or even copyright concerns. Indeed,
several attacks against machine learning systems have been
exposed in the literature [24]. For instance, authors in [11]
designed an inversion attack to coarsely recover faces used
during the training of a white box facial recognition neural
network. More recently, [28] designed a membership attack
allowing to determine if a given image was part of the train-
ing set of a black box machine learning system. In essence,
this membership attack exploits the irregularities on how the
classifier has overfit the training data.
2. Reconstruction by Latent Code Recovery
This section proposes a methodology for reconstructing
the most similar images to target images with an existing
generator.
Inversion of deep representations has been already ad-
dressed in the literature. [20] used a simple optimization
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procedure to maximize an output class of the VGG-like net-
work. This demonstrated a key insight, namely that such
deep nets represent progressively more abstract and large-
scale image features. In the seminal works of [23, 29], a
similar inversion of deep nets unveiled adversarial exam-
ples, which shows that somehow deep networks can be eas-
ily fooled. In [19], generative networks are inverted to study
recall, which is the ability of the network to reproduce all
images in the dataset. Similarly, [22] used latent recovery
of a GAN generator to evaluate its quality, with the hypoth-
esis that a high quality generator also should recover data
samples with high fidelity.
Other works tackle recovering latent codes directly by
training an encoder network to send images back from im-
age space to latent space, such as the BEGAN model [3] or
Adversarially Learned Inference (AGI) [10]. In generative
latent optimization (GLO) [4], a generative model is trained
along with a fixed-size set of latent codes, so that they are
known explicitly when training finishes.
In this paper, we will proceed by recovering latent codes
via optimization, following [22, 5, 18, 19]. In contrast with
[22], we will be concerned with recovering images the gen-
erator has not seen, such as validation images or deliber-
ately distorted images in order to gain insight into the gen-
erator.
2.1. Latent Code Recovery with Euclidean Loss
As demonstrated in this section, the simple Euclidean
loss is effective at recovering latent codes for a variety of
GAN methods. This is in line with many previous works
which demonstrate the efficacy of Euclidean losses used at
the output of a generative network. In [30], Euclidean losses
were shown to be sufficient for a variety of image process-
ing tasks, when a deep generator helps automatically regu-
larize the loss. Here, we consider the following latent re-
covery optimization problem
z?(y) ∈ argmin
z
‖φ(G(z))− φ(y)‖22 (NNG)
where G is a deep generative network, z is the input la-
tent vector and y is the target image. Using a solution z∗
of Problem (NNG), we denote by NNG(y) = G(z∗) the
Nearest Neighbor recovery of a given image y in the set of
generated images, as opposed to the usual NN search in a
dataset D: NND(y) = argminx∈D ‖x − y‖. In this work,
we consider mostly φ as the identity, but other operators are
discussed in the next paragraph and in Section 4. Fig. 1 il-
lustrates the difference between the 2 NN search on a few
examples.
Experimental validation In every experiment, we em-
ploy LBFGS and noted it converges roughly 10x faster than
(a) deformation by smooth diffeomorphism (warping)
(b) Unsupervised inpainting (face completion)
(c) Additive white noise
Figure 2: Median recovery error (MRE, see Eq. (5))
for 1800 test images on various GAN generators (PG-
GAN [16], MESCH [21] and DCGAN [25]) against to vari-
ous distortions φ in latent recovery optimization (NNG) (see
text for details).
SGD (successful recovery requiring approximately 50 it-
erations as opposed to 500 in [5, 18]). Although Prob-
lem. (NNG) is highly non-convex, the proposed latent re-
covery optimization is works surprisingly well, as shown
in Fig. 1 and Fig. 3. In particular for generated images
y = G(z), where NNG(y) = z, a global minimum (ver-
batim copy) is consistently achieved (see third row of Fig. 1
and Fig. 2). Visual inspection revealed that every network
analyzed in this document could verbatim recover generated
images, an observation also noted by [18], exemplified by
the tight distribution of errors near zero in Fig. 4. Note that
we also considered the widely used perceptual loss [15] by
taking φ to be VGG features, with either no improvement
or even degradation of visual results.
2.2. Latent Code Recovery Under Distortion
The Fre´chet Inception Distance (FID), introduced in
[13], is the de facto standard for evaluating the quality of
generated GAN images. The FID is computed by model-
ing the probability distribution of vision relevant features at
the output of the Inception network [27] and was shown to
be in line with human inspection. As an important demon-
stration, the FID was shown to be sensitive to a variety of
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image transformations and corruptions, while other metrics,
such as the inception distance [27], were not sensitive. In
a similar vein, we wish to demonstrate that Eq. (NNG) is
meaningful, by showing that it responds to various distor-
tions φ. We choose φ to be one of the three distortions that
are illustrated in Fig. 2:
• Smooth Vector Field Warp (Fig. 2a) Following [13,
34] we warp training images by bilinear interpolation
with a smooth 2D vector field Vσd = V ∗ g, which is
obtained from the Gaussian smoothing g of a Gaussian
random vector field V (x) ∼ N (0, σ2d);
• Corruption Noise Patches (Fig. 2b) As [17], we cor-
rupt training images by replacing patches of various
sizes with fixed Gaussian noise with variance σ2d;
• Additive Noise (Fig. 2c) We add noise to each training
image withXn = X+Wd, whereWd is sampled from
a Gaussian distribution Wd ∼ N (0, σ2d).
Experimental Validation Fig. 2 demonstrates a number
of insights into latent recovery in Eq. (NNG). First of all,
visual inspection reveals it is powerful enough to recover a
face near the ground truth even if the image has been heav-
ily distorted. It also demonstrates the specificity of the net-
work, for example the three networks highlighted will re-
ject images only slightly outside the manifold. In Table 1,
we can see that not all networks share the same specificity.
For example, the GLO networks can recover distorted im-
ages with similar MRE’s to training images, which means
the networks are less precise. This is coupled with a lower
FID of the network, for example see Fig. 5.
3. Using Latent Recovery to Assess Overfitting
In the context of classification, overfitting pertains to the
discrepancy between classifier performance on images for
which it was trained and validation images not seen during
training. This methodology is far less common with gener-
ative models, in part because there is still disagreement on
how to properly evaluate them [6]. In this section, we ex-
tend the training and validation split to the context of gen-
erative models. Then, we analyze the difference between
image recovery using Eq. (NNG), between training and val-
idation images.
3.1. Training Protocols
We summarize the details of each generative model be-
low, in terms of their training procedure and purpose within
this work.
GAN Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) involve a
stochastic training procedure which simultaneously trains a
discriminator and a generator. The original GAN [12] opti-
mization problem writes
max
D
min
G
Ez∼N (0,1),x∼pdata [Ladv(D,G, z, x)] (1)
where Ladv(D,G, z, x) = log(D(x))+log(1−D(G(z))).
We examine three prominent GANs in the literature. First
is DCGAN [25], as it is one of the most widely used GAN
architectures and with still decent performance across a va-
riety of datasets [19]. Then we study two state-of-the-art
GANs for high resolution generation; progressive growing
of GANs [16], which we refer to as PGGAN and the zero
centered gradient penalty Resnet presented in [21], which
we refer to as MESCH. We train these three GANs on
CelebA-HQ with a training split of the first 26k images and
the first 70k images of LSUN bedroom and tower. We chose
these splits to preserve the quality of each method, as GAN
quality significantly degrades with small dataset sizes.
Generative Latent Optimization (GLO) The recently in-
troduced Generative Latent Optimization (GLO) creates a
mapping from a fixed set of latent vectors to training im-
ages. The GLO objective is as follows
min
G
∑
(zi,xi)
Lrec(G(zi), xi) := ‖G(zi)− xi‖22 (2)
where xi ∈ D refers to training images, zi ∼ N (0, 1) sam-
ples a Gaussian distribution and the pairs (zi, xi) are drawn
once and for all before training begins2. Because we know
the latent distribution is Gaussian, we can easily sample the
network after it is trained.
AutoEncoder GAN (AEGAN) A huge variety of recent
methods use a hybrid adversarial plus reconstruction loss
in their framework, for example being applied to unpaired
domain translation and image inpainting [8, 17]. We study
a simple autoencoder plus adervsarial loss AEGAN with the
objective
max
D
min
G,E
∑
xi∈D
Lrec(G(E(xi)), xi) + Ladv(G,E,D, xi)
(3)
CycleGAN We train a CycleGAN using the official code,
which has the following objective:
max
D1,D2
min
G1,G2
∑
xi∈X ,yi∈Y
Lrec(G2(G1(xi)), xi) + Ladv(G1(xi), D2)
+ Lrec(G1(G2(yi)), yi) + Ladv(G2(yi), D1)
+ Lid(G1(xi), xi) + Lid(G2(yi), yi) (4)
where G1,2, G2,1 are autoencoders translating across do-
mains and D1, D2 are discriminators. We use the Lid loss
as it is enabled by default in the CycleGAN code.
Concerning models trained with a reconstruction loss
(GLO, CYCLEGAN and AEGAN), we selected these archi-
2 Contrary to [4], we do not optimize the latent space and found no
negative impact on the reconstruction capacity and generation quality.
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Figure 3: Latent recovery of training images fromD (left, green frame) and test images from T (right, red frame) for 128x128
images of Celeba-HQ [16]. From top row to bottom are first target images, and then recovery from Progressive GANs [16]
(PGGAN), 0-GP resnet GAN [21] (MESCH), a GLO network [4], and finally an AutoEncoder-GAN network [35] (AE-
GAN). While GLO obviously shows some memorization of training examples, it is hard to visually assess when overfitting
happens for other methods, as discussed in Section 3 (with additional details on architectures and training).
tectures for a theoretical perspective, as they offer interest-
ing windows into how generators can memorize. In par-
ticular, we will study the impact of the training set size N
on the overfitting inclination. For example, while we were
unable to train a good quality GAN with a small set (say
256) images, GLO converges extremely quickly on such a
small set of images. See the GLO-256 network in Fig. 3 (4th
row) where memorization is immediately apparent. As a
result, we will refer respectively to GLO-N , CYCLEGAN-N
and AEGAN-N , to account for this size. Additionally, for
the autoencoder models AEGAN and CYCLEGAN, we forgo
optimization and simply use the reconstruction losses from
the autoencoder. For AEGAN, this corresponds to taking
z∗i = E(xi) w.r.t. Eq. NNG and for CYCLEGAN this corre-
sponds to |G2(G1(x))− x|22 (or vice-versa for the opposite
domain y). For CYCLEGAN, we split both domains into test
and train sets and then compute translations between the
two train sets.
In the next paragraphs, we will proceed to show that it is
possible for generative networks to memorize in the sense
that validation and training sets have significantly different
recovery error distribution.
3.2. Comparison of recovery errors
Figure 4 shows the histograms of recovery errors on
train (D in green) and validation (T in red) datasets from
CelebA-HQ, for various generators. For the sake of read-
ability, the distribution of errors for generated images (yel-
low) from G and distorted images (blue) are only displayed
for PGGAN and MESCH. Confirming visual inspection from
Fig. 1, observe that the recovery errors for generated im-
ages (in yellow) are quite low. Increasing the number of
iterations and using several random initialization improve
results, but have not been used to reduce computation costs.
For both GAN generators PGGAN and MESCH that are
trained on the full 26k dataset D, the difference of recovery
error distribution between the validation (green) and train
(red) set is barely noticeable. Further statistical analysis in
next paragraph shows indeed that such a small gap is very
likely for two samples drawn from the same law and hence
no overfitting is present.
On the other hand, for GLO-N and AEGAN-N generators
with N ∈ {128, 1024, 8192}, the difference is striking, and
is decreasing with N the size of the dataset. Recall that
GLO-N is a DCGAN architecture using GLO criterion [4]
in Eq. (2), and AEGAN-N is an auto encoder that is trained
with a combination of adversarial loss and recovery loss
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(a) PGGAN (b) MESCH
(c) GLO-128 (d) AEGAN-128
(e) GLO-1024 (f) AEGAN-1024
(g) GLO-8192 (h) AEGAN-8192
Figure 4: Histograms or recovery errors on train D and
validation T datasets from CelebA-HQ showing that over-
fitting is not happening for PGGAN and MECSH generators
on the training dataset, but is for GLO-N and AEGAN-N
when training for a small dataset N < 8192.
(see Eq. (4)). Notice that it was not possible in practice to
train pure GAN approaches (PGGAN, DCGAN and MESCH)
with such small datasets. On the other hand, generative net-
works trained with recovery loss create deterministic map-
pings between latent codes and output images, thus enforc-
ing overfitting. However, it is surprising to note that even
with a forced deterministic mapping, GLO and AEGAN al-
most stop memorizing data at only 8192 images.
In the following paragraph, we design a statistical test to
assess automatically when such overfitting is appearing.
3.3. Statistical Analysis
In light of the previous results illustrated in Fig. 4, we
propose two simple definitions to measure and detect over-
fitting without relying on histogram or image inspection.
First, to resume the distribution of errors to a single
value, we consider the Median Recovery Error (MRE),
defined for a generator G and a dataset Y as
MREG(Y) = median
{
min
z
‖yi −G(z)‖2
}
yi∈Y
(5)
Table 1 reports such values for other deep generators (such
as AEGAN) and on other datasets.
Then to measure the distance between two distributions,
that is to estimate to which extent the generator overfits the
training set, we simply compute the normalized MRE-gap
between validation T and train D dataset, which writes
MRE-gapG = (MREG(T )−MREG(D)) /MREG(T ) (6)
These values are reported3 in Table 1.
Now, instead of using an empirical threshold to auto-
matically assess if the amount of overfitting is significant
regarding the size of the training set, we rely on a statis-
tical test. We compute the p-value of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (KS) which measures the probability that two
random samples drawn from the same distribution have a
larger discrepancy (defined as the maximum absolute differ-
ence between cumulative empirical distributions) than the
one observed. Such p-values are displayed in Table 1, and
a threshold of 1% is used to detect overfitting (values are
highlighted). To show the consistency between the two pro-
posed metric, we also highlight the values of MRE-gap that
are above 10%.
Observe that the results are mostly confirming previous
empirical evidences: memorization is strongly correlated to
the number of images seen during training. At N = 26000
on CelebA-HQ and N = 32768 on LSUN bedroom, over-
fitting is no longer detectable.
However, using the proposed statistics (p-value, normal-
ized MRE-gap) is much more practical to detect overfitting
than only inspecting histograms and easier to threshold than
MRE itself. It also illustrates that such statistical principle
overrules empirical evaluation, as memorization is indeed
sometimes quite hard to tell from simple visual inspection,
such as for the AEGAN generator in Fig. 3.
3.4. FID Does Not Detect Memorization
The FID is the standard GAN evaluation metric for im-
ages [13], so it is natural to ask whether this metric can be
used to detect memorization. Figure 5 displays FID scores
computed between generated and training images (in green)
and generated and test images (in red). While the median re-
covery error (MRE) is able to detect memorization in GLO
models, the FID is not sensitive to this. We note that in the
3Notice that other metrics could have been used, such as the Wasser-
stein Wp distance, that, however, requires either histogram quantization
or that the two discrete distributions are computed on the same number of
images.
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Table 1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values, normalized median error difference (MRE-gap) Eq. (6), and Median recovery
errors (MRE) Eq. (5) for a variety of generators. Highlighted values indicate generators for which overfitting of the training
set has been detected: (in blue) below 1% threshold for p-value of the KS test, (in green) above 10% threshold for MRE-gap.
KS p-value MRE-gap MRE
train vs val train val generated small distort
CelebA-HQ
DCGAN 9.43e-01 1.79e-02 4.95e-02 5.04e-02 3.68e-03 5.69e-02
MESCH 4.55e-01 6.96e-03 3.40e-02 3.43e-02 1.77e-02 4.63e-02
PGGAN 2.22e-01 2.22e-02 3.31e-02 3.39e-02 1.78e-02 4.65e-02
GLO-128 0.00e+00 9.70e-01 9.94e-04 3.30e-02 5.10e-05 9.32e-03
GLO-1024 0.00e+00 7.59e-01 1.95e-03 8.08e-03 1.29e-03 4.46e-03
GLO-8192 2.25e-18 1.75e-01 3.00e-03 3.64e-03 1.04e-03 3.20e-03
GLO-26000 2.12e-01 3.69e-02 4.27e-03 4.44e-03 4.08e-04 4.43e-03
AEGAN-128 0.00e+00 9.02e-01 1.54e-02 1.57e-01 N/A 2.82e-02
AEGAN-1024 0.00e+00 2.68e-01 8.52e-02 1.16e-01 N/A 8.69e-02
AEGAN-8192 3.17e-27 1.61e-01 7.42e-02 8.84e-02 N/A 7.55e-02
AEGAN-26000 1.25e-01 1.85e-02 9.96e-02 1.01e-01 N/A 1.00e-01
CYCLEGAN-256 M2F 0.00e+00 4.75e-01 9.03e-03 1.72e-02 N/A -
CYCLEGAN-4096 M2F 0.00e+00 2.62e-01 6.44e-03 8.73e-03 N/A -
LSUN
DCGAN (tower) 7.02e-02 1.36e-02 7.96e-02 8.07e-02 1.49e-02 7.31e-02
DCGAN (bedroom) 3.65e-01 5.34e-03 7.06e-02 7.10e-02 7.03e-02 7.09e-02
GLO-8192 (bedroom) 6.70e-06 1.70e-01 5.45e-03 6.56e-03 5.37e-04 5.01e-03
GLO-32768 (bedroom) 2.62e-01 5.40e-02 6.58e-03 6.25e-03 8.40e-04 5.44e-03
Yosemite CYCLEGAN-256 s2w 1.60e-16 3.68e-01 1.67e-02 2.64e-02 N/A -
CYCELGAN-512 s2w 6.10e-33 3.78e-01 1.39e-02 2.23e-02 N/A -
MNIST
DCGAN 2.41e-01 8.85e-02 3.00e-02 2.75e-02 6.89e-03 -
GLO-1024 0.00e+00 6.78e-01 2.86e-04 8.88e-04 1.49e-03 -
GLO-16384 3.48e-01 6.45e-03 8.72e-04 8.77e-04 1.41e-03 -
AEGAN-16384 7.43e-02 2.29e-02 4.56e-02 4.67e-02 N/A -
CIFAR10 DCGAN 5.40e-01 3.65e-03 2.29e-01 2.28e-01 1.30e-03 -
GLO-1024 0.00e+00 5.84e-01 2.77e-03 6.67e-03 8.53e-04 -
GLO-16384 3.48e-01 6.45e-03 8.72e-04 8.77e-04 1.41e-03 -
work of [26], they introduce notions of precision and recall
for generated images. In a similar way, they note that the
FID doesn’t distinguish models which have dropped many
modes to those which have poor average quality. Finally, we
do not suggest replacing the FID, but rather using MRE to
provide a more complete picture of generator performance.
4. Applications to image editing
Recently, GANs have seen wide application to vari-
ous face generation tasks, such as face attribute modifica-
tion [8], generative face completion [17] and face super-
resolution [9]. Another approach orthogonal to ours can be
found in [30], where recovery is performed by first fixing a
random latent code, and optimizing over the parameters of
a randomly initialized generator. Although their approach
is very flexible and produces compelling results, it is by
design bound to fail at inpainting large areas of semantic
structures such as faces.
As a proof of concept, we show that a vanilla GAN not
Figure 5: Comparison of FID versus Median Recovery Er-
ror (MRE) for various models computed over training im-
ages (in green) and validation images (in red). FID does
not detect memorization in GLO models.
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Figure 6: Image recovery by solving Eq. (NNG) with a 1024x1024 generator G by [16]. From left to right: transformed
image φ(y), recovered image G(z∗(y)) and ground truth image y. The first two rows are image inpainting (φ is a mask) and
next two are image super-resolution of images downsampled by a factor of 64 (φ is an average pooling).
trained for any specific task can solve inverse problem de-
cently well using latent recovery optimization (NNG) with
various operators φ. Fig. 2 already displays some poten-
tial applications. For example, because deep generators are
specific in the images they generate, they can be used to
un-distort (Fig. 2a) images or for blind inpainting (Fig. 2b).
Fig. 6 shows the progressive GAN generator [16] applied
to face inpainting (φ is a mask) and super-resolution (φ is
a 64x pooling). While the face inpainting is artifacted, we
note that the results are decent without any post process-
ing and similar to those presented in [17] (while being non-
feedforward). As for super-resolution, we obtain results at
least on par with [9]. It is also interesting to note that while
the pose of the face remains accurate for both face inpaint-
ing and super-resolution, the identity of the face changes.
This happens despite the use of images that the PGGAN
generator [16] was trained on, which is in accordance with
the observations of Sec. 3. In fact, this is a positive feature
of the algorithm, as hybrid losses in deep inpainting meth-
ods, such as [14], could potentially overfit faces.
5. Discussion and future work
We demonstrated that using a recovery loss, like in GLO,
makes it possible to overfit the training set, even when com-
bined with an adversarial training. However, it is notewor-
thy that GLO and CycleGAN can train with few data points,
while still having a decent generation quality.
We believe overfitting in the sense of Section 3 does not
tell the whole story. For instance, when the network in [21]
is trained on LSUN tower, images of the Eiffel Tower can
be clearly recognized. While for faces, a GAN might per-
fectly generalize w.r.t. individual faces, on other datasets
information about specific objects in the dataset might leak.
In this way, a closer examination of privacy for generative
methods is needed.
Finally, we note that the optimization technique in
Eq. (NNG) failed for a few generators trained on LSUN
bedroom, in the sense that it could not verbatim recover
generated images. This suggests the dataset itself may have
some effect on the organization of the latent space and that
the LSUN latent space is more complex with many local
minima of Eq. (NNG). On the other hand, other networks
were able to successfully verbatim recover generated im-
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ages for LSUN tower and bedroom. We argue this phe-
nomenon needs more investigation.
Conclusion In this work, we elucidated important prop-
erties of deep generators through latent recovery. We saw
that a simple Euclidean loss was very effective at recovering
latent codes and recovers plausible images even after sig-
nificant image transformations. We used this fact to study
whether a variety of deep generators memorize training ex-
amples. Our statistical analysis revealed that overfitting was
undetectable for GANs, but detectable for hybrid adversar-
ial methods like CycleGAN and non-adversarial methods
like GLO, even for moderate training set sizes. Due to the
ever-growing concerns on privacy and copyright of training
data and the widespread application of hybrid adversarial
losses, we provide methodology that is a step in the right
direction towards analysis of overfitting in deep generators.
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A. Apendix
A.1. Optimization Failures
We noted that most networks had the ability to exactly recover generated images. This is shown in Fig. A.1, with failure
cases highlighted in red. Interestingly, some networks were not able to recover their generated images at all, for example
Fig. 7b was a PGGAN trained on LSUN Bedroom, which did not verbatim recover any image. We think this may suggest a
more complex latent space for some networks trained on LSUN, with many local minima to Eq. (NNG). Because we assert
that we are finding the nearest neighbors in the space of generated images, we did not analyze networks which could never
recover generated images. It should be noted that some LSUN networks were able to recover their generated images, for
instance DCGAN [25].
(a) Generated recovery for MESCH on CelebA-HQ. (b) Generated recovery for PGGAN on LSUN Bedroom.
Figure 7: Recovery failure detection with thresholding. First row generated images and second row is recoveries. The
MESCH network in 7a is inconsistent at image recovery, which can be alleviated by restarts. The PGGAN trained on LSUN
bedroom in 7b did not verbatim recover any image.
A.2. Recovery Success Rate
Disregarding networks which could not recover generated images, some networks had higher failure rates than others. To
determine failure cases numerically, we chose a recovery error threshold of MSE < .1 to signify a plausible recovery for real
images (for generated images a much smaller threshold of MSE < .025 can be used, which corresponds to verbatim recovery,
e.g. in A.1). Table 2 summarizes recovery rates for a few networks. The MESCH resnets were notably less consistent than
other architectures. To study if these failures were due to bad initialization, we tried simply restarting optimization 10 times
per image, and saw the success rate go from 68% to 98% (shown in Table 2 as MESCH-10-RESTART). This shows that
likely all training and generated images can be recovered decently well with enough restarts.
Table 2: Recovery success rate for real and generated images. Percentages indicate rate of recoveries with a MSE < .1,
which corresponds to a plausible synthesis. Failures are related to bad initialization, as simply restarting greatly increases
success rate.
train test generated
MESCH 68% 67% 67%
MESCH-10-RESTART 98% 99% 96%
DC-CONV 82% 82% 100%
PGGAN 97% 96% 95%
A.3. Local vs Global overfitting
While GANs generators appear to not overfit the training set on the entire image, one may wonder if they do however
overfit training image patches. To investigate this, we take φ of Eq. (NNG) to be a masking operator on eye or mouth regions
of the image. To first verify this optimization is stable (see Section C, for more information of stability of optimization), we
recover eyes PGGAN for a number of random initializations in Fig. 8. Recovery is consistent for most initializations, which
11
is also the case for global image recovery (see Sec. C). Finally, we observe the recovery histograms and KS p-values for
patches in Fig. 9. As with global recovery, no significant local overfitting is detected for eye or mouth areas: the p-values for
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (used to measure the similarity of the training and validation recovery error distributions) are
p = 0.0545 and p = 0.6918 respectively, above the 1% threshold we used for global overfitting detection.
Target images (after cropping eye on training images)
Recovered images (for different initialization)
Figure 8: Visual results on training images recovery with a masking operator on right eyes (using LBFGS and Euclidean
objective loss, and PGGAN generator). First row: target (real) images yi. First column: initialization. Second column:
optimization after 100 iterations. Recovery is more consistent than global optimization.
(a) Eye patch recovery error. (b) Mouth patch recovery error.
Figure 9: Recover of eye patches (left) and mouth patches (right). The KS p-values for these two graphs are p = 0.0545 and
p = 0.6918 respectively from left to right.
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B. Comparison with Other Loss Functions
We visually compare in Fig. 10 the simple Euclidean loss used in this paper for analyzing overfitting (i.e. φ = Id in
Eq. (NNG)) with other operators:
• φ = pooling by a factor of 32 (as used in applications for super-resolution);
• φ = various convolutional layers of the VGG-19 (i.e. the perceptual loss previously mentioned in the paper).
While the perceptual loss has been shown to be effective for many synthesis tasks, it appears to hinder optimization in the
case when interacting with a high quality generatorG. Observing the recovered images in Fig. 10, the pooling operator seems
to help with recovered textures as it relaxes the loss, while still recovering a highly similar face to the naive loss φ = Id.
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Figure 10: Using other loss functions for image recovery. The first row is target images from CelebA-HQ, the next three
rows are recovery from PGGAN network and the final three are from MESCH generator. Pooling seems to help slightly with
textural details without hindering recovery of facial pose. Surprisingly, a VGG-19 loss hinders recovery for the PGGAN
generator.
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C. Convergence analysis of latent recovery
In general, optimization was successful and converges nicely for most random initializations. We provide numerical
and visual evidence in this section supporting fast and consistent convergence of LBFGS compared to other optimization
techniques like SGD or Adam.
C.1. Protocol
To demonstrate that the proposed optimization of the latent recovery is stable enough to detect overfitting, the same
protocol is repeated in the following experiments. We used the same 20 random latent codes z∗i to generate images as target
for recovery: yi = G(zi∗) . We also used 20 real images as targets the same as in Section 2 for local recovery. We also
initialized the various optimization algorithms with the same 20 random latent codes zi. We plot the median recovery error
(MRE) for 100 iterations. This curve (in red) is the median of all MSE curves (whatever the objective function is) and is
compared to the 25th and 75th percentile (in blue) of those 400 curves.
C.2. Comparison of optimization algorithm
We first show the average behavior in Fig. 12 the chosen optimization algorithm (LBFGS) to demonstrate that it conver-
gences much faster than SGD and Adam. A green dashed line shows the threshold used to detect if the actual nearest neighbor
is well enough recovered (MRE = 0.024). One can see that only 50 iterations are required in half the case to recover the
target image. Figure 11 compares recovery images for PGGAN obtained with LBFGS and SGD optimization algorithms,
demonstrating that LBFGS gives most of the time better results.
C.3. Comparison of objective loss functions
In Figure 13 are plotted the MRE (median recovery error) when optimizing various objective functions:
• Euclidean distance (L2) as used throughout the paper,
• Manhattan distance (L1), which is often used as an alternative to the Euclidean distance that is more robust to outliers,
• VGG-based perceptual loss.
C.4. Convergence with operator φ
Figure 14 demonstrates convergence under various operators φ.
C.5. Recovery with other generators
Figure 15 displays median recovery error (MRE) when optimizing with LBFGS and SGD for DCGAN and MESCH
generators. Visual results are given for LBFGS in Figures 17 and 18. The MESCH network is more inconsistent, but using
10 random initialization is enough to ensure the recovery of a generated (or real) image with 96% chance.
C.6. Convergence on real images
Figure 16 shows highly consistent recovery on real images for the PGGAN network.
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Figure 11: Visual comparison of recovery with LBFGS (top) and SGD for the Euclidean loss (see (NNG) optimization
problem in the main paper.). First row: target (generated) images yi = G(z∗i ). First column: initialization (G(z
(0)
i )).
Second column: optimization after 100 iterations (G(z(100)i )). LBFGS gives much better results than SGD that is much
slower to converge, but still needs sometimes some restart (here shown without restarting).
15
0 20 40 60 80 100
iterations
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
m
ed
ia
n 
re
co
ve
ry
 e
rro
r (
M
RE
)
LBFGS with L2 objective
0 20 40 60 80 100
iterations
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
m
ed
ia
n 
re
co
ve
ry
 e
rro
r (
M
RE
)
SGD with L2 objective
0 20 40 60 80 100
iterations
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
m
ed
ian
 re
co
ve
ry
 er
ro
r (
MR
E)
adam with L2 objective
LBFGS SGD Adam
Figure 12: First row: median recovery error (MRE) curve. Second row: 400 superimposed recovery error curves for 20
images with 20 random initialization. LBFGS (first column) converges faster than SGD or Adam (second and third column
respectively).
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Figure 13: LBFGS with various objectives for latent recovery for PGGAN.
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Figure 14: Using various φ operator for applications (super-resolution, inpainting) has no effect on convergence.
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Figure 15: Comparing LBFGS with SGD and Adam algorithms for generated image recovery with a DCGAN and a MESCH
network
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Figure 16: Top: average convergence curve of LBFGS for recovery of training images. Bottom: Visual results on real images
recovery (training set from celeba-HQ) with LBFGS and Euclidean objective loss, and PGGAN generator. First row: target
(real) images yi. First column: initialization (G(z
(0)
i )). Second column: optimization after 100 iterations (G(z
(100)
i )).
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Figure 17: Visual results on recovery of generated images of a DCGAN network. First row: target (generated) images
yi = G(z
∗
i ). First column: initialization (G(z
(0)
i )). Second column: optimization with LBFGS and Euclidean loss after 100
iterations (G(z(100)i )).
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Figure 18: Visual results on recovery of generated images of a MESCH network. First row: target (generated) images
yi = G(z
∗
i ). First column: initialization (G(z
(0)
i )). Second column: optimization with LBFGS and Euclidean loss after 100
iterations (G(z(100)i )). As previously reported in Section 4, success rate of optimization for MESCH generator is only around
67%, but it can be circumvented easily by restarting with new random initialization or by using Adam optimization.
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